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ABSTRACT
Article V of the United States Constitution articulates the methods for amending the
Constitution. Amendments are formally recommended by either a two-thirds vote of both
Houses of Congress or by a vote of two-thirds of the state legislatures. This latter method is
known as a Convention of States. Despite its inclusion in Article V, no amendment has yet been
proposed for ratification by such a convention. This research aims to explain the history of
Article V, the process for an Article V Convention, the current efforts to call such a convention,
and amendments that should be considered at this convention. Also, this analysis seeks to
disprove the notion that an Article V Convention could undermine the Constitution. The
ultimate purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that a Convention of States is necessary to
protect economic stability and individual freedom throughout the United States.
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Introduction
The United States is in deep trouble. The national debt is over $30 trillion.1 The United
States Congress is more self-interested and corrupt than ever before. The federal bureaucracy
grows ever more oppressive and unaccountable. Fundamental constitutional rights are under
constant assault. Due to these problems, the American people feel pessimistic about the future of
the country. According to a recent Reuters poll, only 25 percent of Americans believe the nation
is on the right track, while 61 percent claim that the country is on the wrong track.2 Some people
claim that the best solution to these problems is to elect new people to Congress. However, this
strategy has been employed for decades, and the problems the United States faces have only
grown during this time. Even if enough reliable Congressmen and Senators could be elected,
this solution would only be temporary at best, considering that they could lose their next
election. Other people argue for Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution.
However, this strategy relies on the very same politicians who have presided over America’s
decline. Instead, there is only one powerful and lasting solution to the numerous problems this
country faces. This solution circumvents the United States Congress. This solution empowers
the people. This solution is a Convention of States.
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Literature Review
The Convention of States movement has had much success in recent years. Arguably the
most prominent organization in this movement is a group by the same name. Convention of
States has encouraged state legislatures to pass resolutions to put fiscal restraints on the federal
government, limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and implement term
limits on Congressmen and Senators. As of April 2022, 19 states have passed these Convention
of States resolutions, with Wisconsin, Nebraska, West Virginia, and South Carolina adopting
such resolutions in 2022.3 With these recent additions, the Convention of States movement is
only 15 states away from calling an Article V Convention.
There is a straightforward process for calling a Convention of States and subsequently
implementing constitutional amendments that this convention proposes. This process was
articulated by Tom Coburn, who was a three-term Oklahoma Congressman, serving from 1995
to 2001, and two-term Oklahoma Senator, serving from 2005 to 2015. He resigned before the
end of his second term to become a Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.
He was also a senior advisor to the Citizens for Self-Governance, where he advocated for a
Convention of States. Coburn’s desire for a Convention of States was motivated by personally
witnessing the widespread corruption and fiscal irresponsibility of the federal government while
in Congress.4
He explains that a convention would assemble once 34 States, or two-thirds of the 50
states, pass a similar resolution calling for this convention. States then send delegates to this
convention. While states can choose the number of delegates they send to the convention, each
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state’s delegation will only have one collective vote at the convention. At the convention,
delegates will vote on one or several amendments to send back to the states. For such
amendments to be considered by the states, they must be approved by most of the convention.
For these amendments to take effect, they must subsequently be ratified by 38 states, or threefourths of the total. Congress can choose whether such amendments must be ratified by the state
legislatures or by state ratification conventions. Once this three-fourths threshold is met, then the
amendments are officially part of the United States Constitution.5
Coburn articulated five reasons for why he was cautiously optimistic about the chances of
an Article V Convention succeeding. First, multiple grassroots organizations are coordinating on
their efforts to call this convention. Second, the national debt has risen to dangerous levels,
making the need for an amendment to place fiscal restraints on Congress greater than ever
before. Third, the internet provides a platform for political organizations to easily communicate
with each other and the public to build grassroots support for the Convention of States
movement. Fourth, state legislatures have grown increasingly conservative in recent years.
Fifth, and finally, concerns about a “runaway” convention, which have hindered previous efforts
at an Article V Convention, have been addressed by scholars such as Robert Natelson.6
One of the most prominent arguments against an Article V Convention is that such a
convention would exceed its mandate and rewrite the Constitution. In such a scenario,
fundamental constitutional rights such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, property rights,
and the right to keep and bear arms would be at risk of being repealed. While this is a
frightening prospect, several prominent scholars have articulated why such a scenario would not
happen.

5
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Robert Natelson is a Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence at the Independence
Institute. He has taught law courses at three different universities over the course of 25 years,
and he is an expert on Constitutional scholarship pertaining to Article V of the Constitution. He
has responded to an article written by amateur historian Chuck Michaelis. In this article,
Michaelis made five major arguments to demonstrate that an Article V Convention would be a
“runaway” convention: the 1787 Convention was America’s first convention; the language of
Article V is vague and would allow Congress to select delegates for an Article V Convention; an
Article V Convention would be uncontrollable since it is an instrument of the people’s sovereign
will; such a convention would likely disregard limits set by the states in their respective
convention applications; and the convention could alter the ratification process, as the 1787
Convention allegedly did.7
Natelson responds to each of these claims by utilizing the following criteria: the historical
background of Article V, the post-Founding era usage of Article V, governing principles of
constitutional, international, and agency law, many Article V court decisions ranging from the
Founding era to the modern day, and various modern political realities.8 These modern realities
include popular opinion, state applications that limit the scope of the conventions, legal
repercussions for commissioners that exceed the scope of their respective state’s applications,
potential judicial challenges brought during the convention process, and the need for any
amendments the convention proposes to be ratified by 38 states before they are implemented.9
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Another scholar on Article V is Robert Kelly, who currently serves as the General
Counsel for Citizens for Self-Governance. He is also a practicing attorney and a member of the
California Bar. He claims that an Article V Convention could exceed its mandate by using
several arguments. First, the text of the Constitution indicates that a convention can be limited in
several ways. These limitations include restricting an Article V Convention to merely proposing
amendments, as well as preventing any amendments from denying the States equal
representation in the United States Senate. Also, there were dozens of multi-state conventions
held before the ratification of the Constitution. These conventions dispel the notion that a
convention would automatically “runaway.” Furthermore, the purpose of Article V was to give
Congress and the state legislatures equal standing to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Finally, over 400 Article V applications have been made by the states throughout history. The
overwhelming majority of these were limited to a particular subject.10
Yet another Article V scholar is Michael Farris, who is the founder of the Home School
Legal Defense Association, as well as Patrick Henry College. Additionally, he is a Senior
Fellow for Constitutional Studies at the Citizens for Self-Governance. Proponents of the
“runaway” convention argument claim that the Constitution was illegally adopted as the result of
such a convention. Farris has evaluated two claims that support this argument.11
The first is that the delegates at the 1787 Convention were instructed to only amend the
Articles of Confederation, but that they went beyond their orders and created a completely new
document. This claim is wrong because the Constitutional Convention was prompted by the

10

Kelly, Robert. “A Single-Subject Convention.” Convention of States Action, n.d.
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/conventionofstates/pages/899/attachments/original/1423177477/Kelly__Sin
gle_Subject_Convention.pdf?1423177477.
11
Farris, Michael. “Can We Trust the Constitution? Answering the ‘Runaway Convention’ Myth.” Convention of
States Action, n.d. https://conventionofstates.com/files/article-3-can-we-trust-the-constitution-answering-therunaway-convention-myth.

x

Annapolis Convention, not by a call from the Articles of Confederation Congress. In fact, seven
state legislatures agreed to send delegates to the Philadelphia Convention before the Articles of
Confederation Congress endorsed this gathering.12
The second claim is that the ratification process for the Constitution was improperly
changed by the 1787 Convention from a unanimous threshold of all 13 States, which existed
under the Articles of Confederation, to only 9 state ratification conventions. However, since the
delegates at the Philadelphia Convention voted to replace the Articles of Confederation with a
new Constitution, they were not limited by the Articles’ unanimous threshold for ratification.
Before the change in the ratification threshold could take effect, all 13 states had to agree with
this new method of ratification, which they did. While the Philadelphia Convention was able to
change the ratification threshold, an Article V Convention would be unable to do so. This is
because the Philadelphia Convention was not governed by the Articles of Confederation, while
an Article V Convention would be governed by the Constitution.13
There are numerous amendments that could be considered at an Article V Convention.
Many of these amendments were articulated by Mark Levin, who is a lawyer, prominent
conservative author, and radio and TV show host. He was also chief of staff for President
Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese. Levin has outlined 11 different amendments for a
Convention of States to consider: term limits for members of Congress, repealing the direct
election of Senators, term limits for Supreme Court Justices and the ability for Congress or the
States to override Supreme Court decisions, two amendments to respectively limit federal
spending and taxation, limits on the federal bureaucracy, protections for free enterprise,
protections for private property, allowing States to directly amend the constitution, granting the
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States the power to check Congress, and protecting the sanctity of the vote.14 However, only
seven of these proposed amendments will be evaluated in this analysis: term limits for members
of Congress, two amendments to respectively limit federal spending and taxation, limits on the
federal bureaucracy, protections for free enterprise, protections for private property, and granting
the States the power to check Congress.
The term limits amendment would prevent any individual from serving more than twelve
years in Congress. This requirement would apply to whether an individual’s time of service
would be spent exclusively in the House of Representatives, exclusively in the Senate, or split
between the two Houses.15
Levin’s spending amendment prevents total federal outlays from exceeding revenues in a
given fiscal year. This amendment also prevents federal outlays in a year from exceeding 17.5
percent of the GDP for that year. The limit on the debt could only be suspended by a three-fifths
vote of both Houses of Congress.16 On the other hand, Levin’s taxing amendment prevents
Congress from extracting more than 15 percent of a person’s annual income. This amendment
also prohibits value-added taxes, national sales taxes, and taxes on a descendant’s estate.
Finally, the deadline for filing federal income tax returns will be moved from April 15 to the day
before federal election day. This is done to remind voters immediately ahead of election day of
the politicians who voted to raise their taxes.17
The amendment placing limits on the federal bureaucracy requires that every
administrative department and agency that is not reauthorized in a stand-alone vote every three
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years by a simple majority of both Houses of Congress automatically expires. Additionally, this
amendment requires that every executive branch regulation that imposes an economic burden of
at least $100 million be submitted for review to a Congressional Delegation Oversight
Committee. This new committee will consist of seven members of the House of Representatives
and seven Senators.18
Levin’s amendment to promote free enterprise clarifies the jurisdiction of the Commerce
Clause. More specifically, this amendment states that Congress’s ability to regulate interstate
commerce does not extend to intrastate commerce, nor does it give Congress the authority to
compel an individual or organization to participate in commerce.19
The amendment to protect private property requires the federal government to fully
compensate property owners for the taking of their property. This taking can either be in the
form of direct seizure or burdensome regulation.20
Finally, Levin’s amendment to allow the states to check Congress implements a thirtyday period between the engrossing of a bill or resolution and its final passage by both Houses of
Congress. This requirement can be overridden by a two-thirds vote in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate. This amendment also allows states to override both federal
statutes and Executive Branch regulations with an economic burden exceeding $100 million with
support from three-fifths of the state legislatures. However, the states must vote to override a
statute or regulation within twenty-four months of them taking effect.21
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Convention of States
The current Convention of States movement is primarily championed by a group of the
same name. Founded in 2013, the goal of the Convention of States is to impose fiscal restraints
on the federal government, limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and limit
the terms of office for its officials. As of April 2022, 19 states have passed the Convention of
States Resolution: Georgia, Alaska, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, Indiana, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, Arizona, North Dakota, Texas, Missouri, Arkansas, Utah, Mississippi, Wisconsin,
Nebraska, West Virginia, and South Carolina. Wisconsin, Nebraska, West Virginia, and South
Carolina were the four most recent states to adopt this resolution, with Wisconsin adopting it on
January 25, Nebraska on January 28, West Virginia on March 4, and South Carolina on March
29 of this year. The Convention of States Resolution has also passed one chamber in 6 different
states: New Hampshire, Virginia, North Carolina, Iowa, South Dakota, and New Mexico.
Finally, the Convention of States Resolution is active in 16 additional states: Maine, Vermont,
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan,
Illinois, Minnesota, Kansas, Montana, Washington, and Hawaii.22
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How A Convention Works
The process for a Convention of States is articulated in Article V of the United States
Constitution. It reads:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
of the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that
no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.23
In his book on the Convention of States movement, former Oklahoma Senator Tom A.
Coburn further describes the process for such a convention. He notes that 34 States, or twothirds of the 50 states, would have to pass a similar resolution to initiate the amendments process.
Once this threshold is met, Congress has a legal obligation to call an amendments convention to
deliberate on topics relevant to the resolutions. States will then send delegates, or
commissioners, to this convention. States can choose the number of delegates they send to the
convention, but each state’s delegation will only have one collective vote at the convention.

23
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Each state would be wise to send an odd number of delegates to the convention, so that there is
no possibility of a tie in a specific delegation when the delegates vote among themselves.
Accordingly, states have typically sent between three and seven delegates to various interstate
conventions throughout history.24
At the convention, one of the delegates is selected as the presiding officer, and then the
delegates vote on rules to govern the convention. Since an amendments convention would not be
under the jurisdiction of Congress, Congress could not set the rules for the Convention. If all
goes successfully, then the delegates will vote on an amendment or several amendments to refer
to the states.25
At the conclusion of the convention, Congress will formally refer the proposed
amendments to the various states, so long as they fit within the guidelines of the resolution which
established the convention. Congress will then decide between two modes of ratification. Either
the amendments will need to be ratified by the state legislatures, or by state conventions of
engaged citizens in the respective states. Congress has required that the state legislatures ratify
26 out of the 27 amendments to the Constitution. However, for the 21st Amendment, which
repealed prohibition, Congress resorted to the state ratifying convention method. Also, the
Constitution, before the Bill of Rights was included, was ratified by state ratifying conventions.
Beyond choosing between these two options, Congress would have no further involvement in the
ratification process. Congress is forbidden from altering the wording of any amendments
proposed by the convention. If 38 states, or three-fourths of the total, ratify any of the proposed
amendments, then they are adopted. The President can then sign the certification of the newly

24
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ratified amendments, although this is not a requirement. For example, the archivist signed the
certification for the 27th Amendment. After this process is completed, the amendments are
officially part of the United States Constitution.26
In chapter 4 of his book, Coburn offers five reasons for why he is cautiously optimistic
about an Article V amendments convention occurring. First, a previous Article V Convention
attempt for a Balanced Budget Amendment that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s only had one
primary advocacy group – The National Taxpayers Union. On the other hand, multiple advocacy
groups are currently coordinating with the Convention of States organization to call an
amendments convention. Second, the debt and deficit are exponentially higher today than they
were several decades ago. Therefore, the need for a convention is greater than ever before.
Third, the internet allows for better coordination between individuals and organizations working
at the grassroots level to build support for an amendments convention. The previous attempt at a
Balanced Budget Amendment convention, which occurred before the internet age, only fell two
states short of calling a convention. Fourth, state legislatures have grown more conservative and
more Republican in recent decades. Since the Convention of States movement is primarily, but
not exclusively, supported by political conservatives, the Convention of States resolution has a
more receptive audience among the state legislatures. Coburn noted that after the November
2016 elections, Republicans held both houses of the legislature, as well as the governorship, in
25 states, as opposed to only 6 Democratic trifectas. Furthermore, Republicans held 68 out of 99
state legislative chambers nationwide in comparison to Democrats’ 31. Today, Republicans still
hold 62 of the 99 state legislative chambers across the nation, having recently regained control of
the Virginia House of Delegates in the November 2021 elections. Finally, intellectually honest

26
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discussions surrounding an amendments convention are easier to obtain due to scholarship from
figures such as Robert Natelson. These scholars have debunked criticism that such a convention
could far exceed its purpose and harm the core structure of the Constitution. This criticism has
often been referred to as the “runaway convention” argument.27
The “Runaway Convention” Myth
A Single-Subject Convention
Opponents of a constitutional convention often argue that once a convention convenes, it
cannot be restricted in any meaningful way, and that it could result in the destruction of the
Constitution as we know it.28 This argument is flawed for several reasons.
First, the text of Article V of the Constitution indicates that a convention can be limited
in some ways. For example, a convention is limited to merely “proposing amendments,” and
thus cannot ratify its own proposals. The text also prevents two topics from being amended in
any context: provisions relating to the import of slaves being invalid until after 1808 (no longer
applicable), and no amendment can be made to deny states equal representation in the Senate.29
Second, there is a long history of conventions in colonial America prior to Article V of
the Constitution. In the century leading up to the ratification of the Constitution, there were at
least 32 multi-state conventions that occurred. Most of these conventions were limited to
specific subject matters, and the delegates to these conventions strictly adhered to these
subjects.30
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Third, the purpose of Article V was to give Congress and the state legislatures equal
standing to propose amendments to the Constitution. Since Congress has direct control over the
amendments it proposes, the state legislatures would as well. Even if certain delegates attempted
to go rogue in proposing amendments outside the limits of the Convention of States Resolution,
which would likely result in legal repercussions from their respective states’ legislatures, such a
move would have to be approved by most of the convention and then 38 of the states, a
substantial obstacle.31
Finally, states have implicitly understood that they can limit the scope of their Article V
applications. The majority of the over 400 Article V applications made throughout U.S. history
have been limited to a particular subject.32 If states could not limit the scope of their Article V
applications, then Congress should have been required to call an amendments convention in the
early 20th century, when the threshold of two-thirds of states submitting applications was met.
Since these states submitted differing resolutions, Congress was under no such obligation.
Therefore, Congress only aggregating uniform applications into cohesive groups is an admission
that states can limit the subjects discussed at a convention.33
Can We Trust the Constitution? Answering the “Runaway Convention” Myth
Proponents of this myth contend that the Constitution was illegally adopted because of a
runaway Convention. They make two claims to support this assertion. The first is that the
convention delegates were instructed to merely amend the Articles of Confederation, but instead

31
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decided to write a completely new document. The second is that the ratification threshold was
illegitimately changed from a unanimous 13 states to 9 state ratification conventions.34
The first claim is wrong because the Constitutional Convention was prompted by the
Annapolis Convention, not by a call from the Articles of Confederation Congress. The delegates
from the 5 states participating at the Annapolis Convention concluded that a broader convention
was needed to address the problems facing the young nation. They called for this Convention to
start in Philadelphia in May 1787. The goal of the Philadelphia Convention was “to render the
constitution of the Federal Government adequate for the exigencies of the Union.”35 The
Articles of Confederation Congress did not play any role in this process. The states possessed
the residual sovereignty to call this convention outside the jurisdiction of the Articles of
Confederation, and they sent copies of their resolution to Congress solely out of respect. Seven
state legislatures agreed to send delegates to the Philadelphia Convention prior to the Articles
Congress endorsing it. The States told the delegates that the purpose of this Convention was the
one previously outlined by the Annapolis Convention.36
On February 21, 1787, Congress voted to endorse the Convention, but it recommended
that the delegates only amend the Articles and take steps to render the Federal Constitution
adequate. However, such a recommendation was merely advisory. Accordingly, of the 12 states
that sent delegates to the Constitutional Convention, ten of them adopted the broader framework
of the Annapolis Convention, which allowed them to replace the Articles of Confederation if
necessary. On the other hand, only New York and Massachusetts adopted the strict
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recommendations of the Articles of Confederation Congress. In short, while the states called for
the 1787 Constitutional Convention outside the jurisdiction of Congress and the Articles of
Confederation, the process for a future convention would be governed by Article V of the
Constitution, thus preventing the states from discarding the Constitution.37
The second claim is also wrong. The Articles of Confederation required unanimous
approval of all 13 states to amend its Constitution. Additionally, the Annapolis Convention and
most states agreed that any amendments to the Articles of Confederation would have to be
unanimously approved. Since the States were sovereigns under the terms of the Articles of
Confederation, and the Articles essentially functioned as a treaty between the various states, all
parties would have to approve for changes to be made to the agreement. However, since the
delegates at the Philadelphia Convention decided to replace the Articles of Confederation with a
new Constitution, they were not strictly bound by the unanimous threshold for ratification.
Therefore, the Convention lowered the threshold for ratification of the Constitution from 13
states to 9. Additionally, the Philadelphia Convention selected state ratifying conventions as the
method for the Constitution to be ratified, so that the ratification process could be as close as
possible to the people the Constitution would govern.38
Before this change in the ratification threshold could take effect, all 13 states would have
to agree to this method of ratification. Since all 13 state legislatures established such
conventions, this threshold was legally changed. Although the delegates at the 1787
Constitutional Convention found a way to change the ratification threshold, such a change could
not be made at a modern-day amendments convention. This is because such a convention would

37
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be governed by Article V of the Constitution, which unlike the Articles of Confederation that
preceded it, governs the convention and ratification process.39
A Response to the “Runaway Scenario”
Professor Robert G. Natelson, a noteworthy scholar on the Convention of States
movement, responded to an article written by Chuck Michaelis, a businessman and amateur
historian. In this article, Michaelis warns about the dangers of a constitutional convention. He
claims that there are numerous uncertainties to the Article V convention process that could lead
to a “runaway convention.” He makes several arguments to justify his concerns. First, he claims
that the 1787 Philadelphia Convention was America’s “first constitutional convention.” Second,
he asserts that the language of Article V allows Congress to select and allocate delegates to a
constitutional convention. Simply put, the convention process would be placed in the hands of
the same institution that has routinely abused its authority. Third, Michaelis states that a
convention is an uncontrollable body that would have the unbridled ability to propose
amendments. Fourth, he predicts that delegates to a convention would disregard limits placed on
them by state delegations. He argues that the Philadelphia Convention proved to be a runaway
convention, despite “strongly worded” congressional language directed towards the delegates.
Fifth, and finally, Michaelis states that the constitutional convention could alter the ratification
process, just as the Philadelphia Convention did.40
To refute these claims, professor Natelson claims that five concepts must first be
understood: the historical, legal, and linguistic background to Article V; two centuries of postFounding era usage of Article V; governing principles of constitutional, international, and
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agency law; many Article V court decisions ranging from 1798 to the 21st century; and various
modern political realities.41
Michaelis states that an Article V Amendments Convention would be akin to the 1787
Convention. However, there is a great difference between a “convention for proposing
amendments” and a “constitutional convention.” A constitutional convention is tasked with
drafting, proposing, and adopting a new charter, while a convention for proposing amendments is
charged with drafting and proposing one or more amendments to this charter. James Madison
once argued that a constitutional convention is plenipotentiary in our system, while an
amendments convention is subject to the forms of the constitution.42 Michaelis asserts that any
gathering that seeks to change constitutional rules amounts to a constitutional convention. Using
this definition, the Philadelphia Convention was not the first constitutional convention in
American history: The 1754 Albany Congress proposed a plan of colonial union; the First
Continental Congress institutionalized interstate cooperation; the 1780 Hartford Convention
recommended amending the Articles of Confederation; the 1786 Annapolis Convention
recommended amendments; and the Second Continental Congress drafted and proposed the
Articles of Confederation. Also, one of the most prominent conventions to meet since the 1787
Convention was the 1861 Washington Conference Convention. This was an assembly of 21
states that proposed a slavery-related amendment in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to
prevent the Civil War.43
Michaelis is wrong to suggest that gaps exist in the language of Article V. When writing
this article, the Founders used words that had a universally accepted meaning. Accordingly, a
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general convention would be a meeting of the States. Also, a “call” did not include authority for
Congress to dictate the apportionment or selection of delegates to a convention. Additionally,
the ratification record confirms that in an Article V Convention, the applying states would
control the subject matter and the state legislatures would control their delegates. Subsequent
constitutional jurisprudence supports the notion that the Founders established safeguards on the
Article V Convention process. Natelson discusses that “the Supreme Court has held repeatedly
that Article V consists of grants of enumerated powers to named assemblies (legislatures and
convention). As some very modern Supreme Court opinions make clear, Founding Era customs
and understandings largely define the scope of the Constitution’s words and its grants.”44
Michaelis’s claim that a convention cannot be limited stems from the idea that such a
gathering is sovereign, and thus is a direct and exclusive representation of the people’s will. This
view is supported by the fact that a few state conventions acted this way during the
Revolutionary era. However, such a view contradicts most historical experiences and established
law. At the time of the ratification of the Constitution, nearly all interstate conventions had been
limited by topic. Since then, the same has held true for almost all such conventions. Also,
established constitutional law holds that legislatures and conventions derive all their authority
from the Constitution. Therefore, a state convention commissioned to consider only a single
proposed amendment or set of amendments will be limited to that purpose.45
There are several historical facts that disprove Michaelis’s assertion that the 1787
Convention was called by Congress for the limited purpose of amending the Articles of
Confederation. The most obvious is that the Constitutional Convention was not called by
Congress, but by Virginia and New Jersey in response to the recommendations of the Annapolis
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Convention. This process was in line with that of most multi-state conventions during the
Founding era, which were also called by the states.46
There are several other relevant historical truths worth considering. First, the Articles of
Confederation operated as a treaty among sovereign states, unlike the Constitution. The States
under the jurisdiction of the Articles of Confederation operated like Member States participating
in the United Nations. With UN Member States and the pre-Constitution States alike, all
signatories can reconsider the terms of their connections, even if the central governing body
objects. Additionally, ten of the twelve states participating in the 1787 Convention authorized
their delegates to consider changes to the American constitutional order that were not limited to
merely amending the Articles. The two states that opposed the expanded power of delegates
were New York and Massachusetts, where anti-federalist sentiment was strong. After seven
states had signed up to join the 1787 Convention, these two states requested that Congress limit
the Convention to amending the Articles. In response, Congress merely claimed that it was in
their opinion for the Constitutional Convention to be limited to amending the Articles of
Confederation. Finally, only seven delegates from these two states lacked the power to propose
a new form of government, due to the terms adopted by their home states. Of these seven, only
three delegates signed the Constitution: Alexander Hamilton, Nathaniel Gorham, and Rufus
King. Hamilton signed the Constitution in an individual capacity. Therefore, the only delegates
who arguably went rogue were Gorham and King, while the dozens of others who signed it were
within the jurisdiction of their commission.47
Finally, Michaelis’ claim that the Philadelphia Convention changed the ratification
process lacks historical context. Admittedly, the convention did adopt a process that differed
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from the one established in the Articles of Confederation. However, as previously noted, the
1787 Convention was not called for under the jurisdiction of the Articles. On the other hand, a
modern-day amendments convention would be called for under the jurisdiction of the United
States Constitution. Therefore, it would be bound by the Constitution’s strict ratification
procedures.48 Also, even if Michaelis’ claim of a runaway convention was correct, there were
nearly 20 other multi-state conventions in the 18th and 19th centuries that did not exceed their
jurisdiction. Examples include the Providence Conventions of 1776-77 and 1781, the 1777
Springfield and York Town Conventions, the New Haven Price Convention of 1778, the
Hartford Conventions of 1779 and 1780, the 1780 Philadelphia Price Convention and Boston
Convention, and the 1861 Washington Conference Convention.49
Furthermore, there are numerous safeguards that would prevent a runaway amendments
convention: the damage that the disregard of clear limits would inflict on a commissioner’s
reputation; popular opinion; state applications defining the scope of the convention; the limit on
the scope of the call; potential lawsuits to enforce these limits; state instructions to
commissioners and the ability to recall such commissioners if they attempt to ignore these
instructions; the need to gather a majority of state delegations to propose amendments;
Congress’s ability and responsibility to refuse to choose a mode of ratification for extraneous
amendments; 38 states would have to ratify any amendment proposed by the convention; and
judicial challenges could be brought during the ratification phase of this process.50
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Proposed Constitutional Amendments
In his 2013 book on the Convention of States, Mark Levin proposes 11 different
amendments to help restore the American Republic. However, the seven most prominent are
Congressional term limits, two separate amendments to respectively limit federal spending and
taxation, limits on the federal bureaucracy, promoting free enterprise, protecting private property
rights, and allowing the States to override certain Congressional statutes. Each of these proposed
constitutional amendments warrants further examination.
An Amendment to Establish Term Limits for Members of Congress
No person may serve more than twelve years as a member of Congress, whether such
service is exclusively in the House or the Senate or combined in both Houses. Upon
ratification of this Article, any incumbent member of Congress whose term exceeds the
twelve-year limit shall complete the current term, but thereafter shall be ineligible for
further service as a member of Congress.51
In the Republican midterm wave of 2010, 85 percent of incumbents from both parties
were reelected. More specifically, 397 members ran for re-election and 339 won, a reelection
rate of 85 percent. In the Senate, 25 incumbents ran for reelection, and 21 won, a Senate
incumbent reelection rate of 84 percent. In 2008, the reelection rate for Representatives was 94
percent, while it was 83 percent for Senators.52 The incumbent reelection rate has remained high
in recent years. In the House of Representatives, the reelection rate was nearly 90 percent in
2012, over 95 percent in 2014, almost 97 percent in 2016, 91 percent in 2018, and almost 95
percent in 2020. In the Senate, the incumbent reelection rate was over 91 percent in 2012, more
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than 82 percent in 2014, over 93 percent in 2016, more than 84 percent in 2018, and nearly 84
percent in 2020.53
The consistently high incumbent reelection rate in recent years stands in stark contrast
with the historical standard. University of California Irvine professor Mark P. Petracca noted
that “throughout most of the nineteenth century, not very members of Congress sought
reelection. Not until 1901…did the average number of terms served by House members prior to
the present session rise above two terms.”54 He continued, “There were few occasions in which
the average length of service approached two terms, but no more than a handful of some 56
sessions…during the 25 elections between 1850 and 1898…turnout averaged 50.2 percent. On
average, more than half the House during any given session in the second half of the nineteenth
century was made up of first term members.”55
Term limits currently apply to the Presidency by means of the 22nd Amendment. At the
state level, 36 out of 50 states have some form of term limits on their Governors, while 15 states
have term limits for their state legislators. There are also term limits in some jurisdictions on
municipal, county, and town governing bodies.56 This proposed amendment would extend term
limits to members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. The purpose of
term limits is to prevent the emergence of a self-perpetuating class of career politicians who
become entrenched in the corrupt ways of the federal government and less responsive to the
needs of their constituents.
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The merits of term limits were recognized by Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson.
On July 26, 1787, during the Constitutional Convention, Franklin proclaimed, “It seems to have
been imagined by some that the returning to the mass of the people was degrading the
magistrate…In free Governments the rulers are the servants and the people their superiors &
sovereigns. For the former therefore to return among the latter was not to degrade but to
promote them.”57 He continued that “it would be imposing an unreasonable burden on them to
keep them always in a State of servitude, and not allow them to become again one of the
Masters.”58 Additionally, Jefferson wrote the following to James Madison in December 1787: “I
dislike, and strongly dislike…the abandonment, in every instance, of the principle of rotation in
office, and most particularly in the case of the President….”59 In February 1800, Jefferson told
Samuel Adams that a “government by representees, elected by the people at short periods, was
our object, and our maxim at that day was, ‘Where annual election ends, tyranny begins’; nor
have our departures from it been sanctioned by the happiness of their effects….”60
An amendment to impose term limits on Congress will prevent the emergence of a distant
political elite and require a predictable rotation in office of elected officials.
Two Amendments to Limit Federal Spending and Taxing
Spending:
Congress shall adopt a preliminary fiscal year budget no later than the first Monday in
May for the following fiscal year, and submit said budget to the President for
consideration. Shall Congress fail to adopt a final fiscal year budget prior to the start of
each fiscal year, which shall commence on October 1 of each year, and shall the
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President fail to sign said budget into law, an automatic, across-the-board, 5 percent
reduction in expenditures from the prior year’s fiscal budget shall be imposed for the
fiscal year in which a budget has not been adopted. Total outlays of the United States
Government for any fiscal year shall not exceed its receipts for that fiscal year. Total
outlays of the United States Government for each fiscal year shall not exceed 17.5
percent of the Nation’s gross domestic product for the previous calendar year. Total
receipts shall include all receipts of the United States Government but shall not include
those derived from borrowing. Total outlays shall include all outlays of the United States
Government except those for the repayment of debt principal. Congress may provide for
a one-year suspension of one or more of the preceding sections in this Article by a threefifths vote of both Houses of Congress, provided the vote is conducted by roll call and
sets forth the specific excess of outlays over receipts or outlays over 17.5 percent of the
Nation’s gross domestic product. The limit on the debt of the United States held by the
public shall not be increased unless three-fifths of both Houses of Congress provide for
such an increase by roll call vote. This Amendment shall take effect in the fourth fiscal
year after its ratification.61
Taxing:
Congress shall not collect more than 15 percent of a person’s annual income, from
whatever source derived. “Person” shall include natural and legal persons. The deadline
for filing federal income tax returns shall be the day before the date set for elections to
federal office. Congress shall not collect tax on a descendant’s estate. Congress shall not
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institute a value-added tax or national sales tax or any other tax in kind or form. This
Amendment shall take effect in the fourth fiscal year after its ratification.62
The need for Constitutional limits on federal spending and taxation is apparent. In The
Liberty Amendments, Mark Levin articulates the fiscal problems confronting the nation.
In 2002, the federal government spent a little more than $2 trillion. By 2008, it spent
$2.98 trillion. Federal spending increased to $3.5 trillion in 2009, $3.45 trillion in 2010, $3.6
trillion in 2011, and $3.79 trillion in 2012. As a percentage of GDP, federal spending for fiscal
operations was 19.1 percent in 2002, 20.8 percent in 2008, 25.2 percent in 2009, 24.1 percent in
2010 and 2011, and 24.3 percent in 2012.63 Federal deficits have also increased dramatically. In
2002, the annual federal deficit was $157 billion. This figure increased to $458 billion in 2008,
$1.4 trillion in 2009, $1.29 trillion in 2010 and 2011, and $1.32 trillion in 2012.64
As for the total federal debt, the figure stood at $10.69 trillion in 2008, $12.14 trillion in
2009, $13.8 trillion in 2010, $15.22 trillion in 2011, and more than $16.3 trillion in 2012.65 This
equates to $111,000 per taxpayer, even though the average annual income was only about
$51,000 in 2012.66 As a percentage of GDP, federal debt stood at 58.8 percent in 2002. This
rose to 69.7 percent in 2008, 85.2 percent in 2009, 94.2 percent in 2010, 98.7 percent in 2011,
and an astonishing 104.8 percent of GDP in 2012.67 Accordingly, the CBO estimated in 2011
that “the government’s yearly net interest spending will more than triple between 2011 and 2021
(from $225 billion to $792 billion) and double as a share of GDP (from 1.5 percent to 3.3
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percent).”68 The CBO continued, “Large budget deficits and growing debt would reduce
national savings, leading to higher interest rates, more borrowing from abroad, and less domestic
investment – which in turn would lower the growth of incomes in the United States.”69
The federal government’s fiscal problems have grown exponentially in recent years. This
fiscal irresponsibility is largely a result of federal politicians across the political aisle lacking any
concern for the nation’s fiscal sustainability. The nation’s fiscal health was further harmed by
profligate spending over the past two years that was initially prompted by the coronavirus
pandemic. Accordingly, federal spending totaled $4.109 trillion in FY 2018 and $4.447 trillion
in FY 2019. The federal deficit during these two years was $779.1 billion and $983.6 billion,
respectively. However, federal spending skyrocketed to $6.550 trillion in FY 2020, while the
deficit climbed to $3.129 trillion. In FY 2021, federal spending was projected to rise even
further to approximately $7.250 trillion, while the deficit totaled $3.669 trillion. Over the next
several years, federal spending and the deficit are projected to remain at alarming levels: FY
2022 – $6.011 trillion in federal spending, $1.837 trillion deficit; FY 2023 – $6.013 trillion in
federal spending, $1.372 trillion deficit; FY 2024 – $6.187 trillion in federal spending, $1.359
trillion deficit; FY 2025 - $6.508 trillion in federal spending, $1.470 trillion deficit; and FY 2026
– $6.746 trillion in federal spending, $1.414 trillion deficit.70
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Fiscal Year

Federal Spending

Federal Deficit

2018

$4.109 Trillion

$779.1 Billion

2019

$4.447 Trillion

$983.6 Billion

2020

$6.550 Trillion

$3.129 Trillion

2021

$7.250 Trillion

$3.669 Trillion

2022

$6.011 Trillion

$1.837 Trillion

2023

$6.013 Trillion

$1.372 Trillion

2024

$6.187 Trillion

$1.359 Trillion

2025

$6.508 Trillion

$1.470 Trillion

2026

$6.746 Trillion

$1.414 Trillion

In addition to reckless spending levels and an enormous federal debt, the United States is
burdened by tens of trillions of dollars in unfunded liabilities. As of 2012, the total unfunded
liability of Medicare was $42.8 trillion, and the program’s trustees estimated that Medicare
spending could account for 10.4 percent of GDP by 2086. Additionally, the total unfunded
liability of Social Security in 2012 was $20.5 trillion. As Mark Levin noted, the total obligations
by the federal government, or “the accumulated debt from yearly fiscal operations plus the net
present value of all unfunded liabilities – amounted to over $90 trillion in 2012. Moreover, the
real yearly deficits, adding together all debt and liabilities, in 2011 and 2012 were about $4.6
trillion and $6.9 trillion, respectively.”71 As a result of this widespread fiscal irresponsibility, the
nation’s credit score was downgraded for the first time in its history. On August 5, 2011,
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Standard & Poor’s, citing “negative long-term outlook,” downgraded the United States’ credit
rating from the highest rating of AAA to AA+.72 Since this report, unfunded liabilities for
Medicare and Social Security have increased dramatically. As of December 2021, the unfunded
liability for Medicare was $103.4 trillion, while the unfunded liability for Social Security was
$59.8 trillion. Taken together, unfunded liabilities total $163.2 trillion, or nearly $490,000 per
citizen.73
Taxation is also excessive, and increased tax rates help fuel irresponsible federal
spending. Federal income tax rates have increased far beyond their initial levels. Following the
ratification of the 16th Amendment in 1913, 7 income tax brackets were established. Incomes
were taxed at 1 percent up to $20,000, 2 percent between $20,000 and $50,000, 3 percent
between $50,000 and $75,000, 4 percent between $75,000 and $100,000, 5 percent between
$100,000 and $250,000, 6 percent between $250,000 and $500,000, and 7 percent for annual
incomes exceeding $500,000.74 Adjusted for inflation, as of 2022, the rates were 1 percent for
incomes up to $573,164, 2 percent for incomes between $573,164 and $1,432,909, 3 percent for
incomes between $1,432,909 and $2,149,364, 4 percent for incomes between $2,149,364 and
$2,865,818, 5 percent for incomes between $2,865,818 and $7,164,545, 6 percent for incomes
between $7,164,545 and $14,329,091, and 7 percent for incomes over $14,329,091.75
The top tax rate of 7 percent in 1913 applied to very few individuals. On the other hand,
current tax rates are both higher and more progressive than in 1913. Just as was the case in
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1913, there were seven income tax brackets in income year 2021. For married taxpayers filing
jointly, the tax rates and corresponding income thresholds are as follows: 10 percent up to
$19,900, 12 percent between $19,900 and $81,050, 22 percent between $81,050 and $172,750,
24 percent between $172,750 and $329,850, 32 percent between $329,850 and $418,850, 35
percent between $418,850 and $628,301, and 37 percent for incomes above $628,301.76 For
heads of household, the tax rates and corresponding income thresholds are as follows: 10 percent
up to $14,200, 12 percent between $14,200 and $54,200, 22 percent between $54,200 and
$86,350, 24 percent between $86,350 and $164,900, 32 percent between $164,900 and $209,400,
35 percent between $209,400 and $523,600, and 37 percent for incomes above $523,600.77
Finally, for both married people filing individually and single filers, the tax rates and
corresponding income thresholds are as follows: 10 percent up to $9,950, 12 percent between
$9,950 and $40,525, 22 percent between $40,525 and $86,375, 24 percent between $86,375 and
$164,925, 32 percent between $164,925 and $209,425, 35 percent between $209,425 and
$523,600, and 37 percent for incomes above $523,600.78
While other nations have higher income tax rates than the United States, the U.S. has
among the most progressive income tax systems in the world. More specifically, an OECD
report found varying discrepancies in five countries between the share of national income earned
by the top 10 percent of earners and the share of the national tax burden for this group. In
France, the top 10 percent earned 25.5 percent of national income and paid 28 percent of national
income taxes. In Germany, the top 10 percent earned 29.2 percent of national income and paid
31.2 percent of national income taxes. In Sweden, the top 10 percent earned 26.6 percent of
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national income and paid 26.7 percent of national income taxes. In the United Kingdom, the top
10 percent earned 32.3 percent of national income and paid 38.6 percent of national income
taxes. Finally, in the United States, the top 10 percent earned 33.5 percent of national income
and paid 45.1 percent of national income taxes.79
As opposed to high tax rates that are uniformly imposed across all income brackets, a
progressive tax system disproportionately burdens high income earners. The federal income tax
system in the United States remains disproportionately burdensome to high income earners, as
illustrated by a recent report from the Tax Foundation. This report analyzed Internal Revenue
Service data on individual income taxes for tax year 2019. This report found that the top 1
percent of income earners paid an average rate of 25.6 percent, which is more than seven times
the 3.5 percent rate paid by the bottom 50 percent of income earners. The average tax rates for
the other income groups were 6.9 percent for the top 50 to 25 percent, 9.8 percent for the top 25
to 10 percent, 13.3 percent for the top 10 to 5 percent, and 17.4 percent for the top 5 to 1 percent
of income earners. The income thresholds for that year were as follows: bottom 50 percent –
AGI below $44,269; top 25 percent – AGI above $87,917; top 10 percent – AGI above
$154,589; top 5 percent – AGI above $221,572; and top 1 percent – AGI above $546,434.80
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Income Percentiles

Income Thresholds

Average Income Tax Rate

Bottom 50 Percent

AGI below $44,269

3.5 Percent

Top 50 to 25 Percent

AGI above $44,269

6.9 Percent

Top 25 to 10 Percent

AGI above $87,917

9.8 Percent

Top 10 to 5 Percent

AGI above $154,589

13.3 Percent

Top 5 to 1 Percent

AGI above $221,572

17.4 Percent

Top 1 Percent

AGI above $546,434

25.6 Percent

The top 50 percent of taxpayers paid 97 percent of all income taxes, while the bottom 50
percent paid only 3 percent. Also, the top 1 percent paid a greater share of the total individual
income taxes (38.8 percent) than the entire bottom 90 percent of taxpayers combined (29.2
percent). The share of national income compared to federal income tax rates for each major
income group is as follows: bottom 50 percent – 11.5 percent of national income, 3.1 percent of
total income taxes paid; top 50 to 25 percent – 19.7 percent of national income, 10.3 percent of
total income taxes paid; top 25 to 10 percent – 21.5 percent of national income, 15.8 percent of
total income taxes paid; top 10 to 5 percent – 11.4 percent of national income, 11.4 percent of
total income taxes paid; top 5 to 1 percent – 15.8 percent of national income, 20.7 percent of
total income taxes paid; top 1 percent – 20.1 percent of national income, 38.8 percent of total
income taxes paid.81
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Income Percentiles

Percent of National Income

Percent of Income Taxes Paid

Bottom 50 Percent

11.5 Percent

3.1 Percent

Top 50 to 25 Percent

19.7 Percent

10.3 Percent

Top 25 to 10 Percent

21.5 Percent

15.8 Percent

Top 10 to 5 Percent

11.4 Percent

11.4 Percent

Top 5 to 1 Percent

15.8 Percent

20.7 Percent

Top 1 Percent

20.1 Percent

38.8 Percent

While the tax code imposes burdensome tax rates, it is also unnecessarily complex. In
2012, the National Taxpayer Advocate reported the following: “U.S. taxpayers (both individuals
and businesses) [spend] more than 6.1 billion hours to complete filings required by a tax code
that contains almost four million words and that, on average, has more than one new provision
added to it daily. Indeed, few taxpayers complete their returns without assistance. Nearly 60
percent of taxpayers hire paid preparers, and another 30 percent rely on commercial software to
prepare their returns.”82
Given the widespread complexity of the tax code, as well as burdensome tax rates and the
excessive national debt, the aforementioned Constitutional Amendments to limit spending and
taxation are necessary.
An Amendment to Limit the Federal Bureaucracy
All federal departments and agencies shall expire if said departments and agencies are not
individually reauthorized in stand-alone reauthorization bills every three years by a
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majority vote of the House of Representatives and the Senate. All Executive Branch
regulations exceeding an economic burden of $100 million, as determined jointly by the
Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Budget Office, shall be
submitted to a permanent Joint Committee of Congress, hereafter the Congressional
Delegation Oversight Committee, for review and approval prior to their implementation.
The Committee shall consist of seven members of the House of Representatives, four
chosen by the Speaker and three chosen by the Minority Leader; and seven members of
the Senate, four chosen by the Majority Leader and three chosen by the Minority Leader.
No member shall serve on the Committee beyond a single three-year term. The
Committee shall vote no later than six months from the date of the submission of the
regulation to the Committee. The Committee shall make no change to the regulation,
either approving or disapproving the regulation by majority vote as submitted. If the
Committee does not act within six months from the date of the submission of the
regulation to the Committee, the regulation shall be considered disapproved and must not
be implemented by the Executive Branch.83
Over time, the federal bureaucracy has expanded to be an unaccountable, allencompassing leviathan that exceeds Constitutional dictates and restricts individual liberty.
While these various bureaucratic agencies technically fall within the jurisdiction of the executive
branch, their scope has expanded to the point where they are often referred to as the Fourth
Branch of the federal government. The case for restraints on these administrative agencies’
power has a long history.
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In Federalist 48, James Madison described how Congress should be the most powerful of
the three branches. He wrote, “The legislative department derives a superiority in our
governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive,
and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated
and indirect measure, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.”84
However, he noted that this power was not unlimited: “It is agreed on all sides, that the powers
properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely
administered by either of the other departments.”85
In Federalist 51, Madison wrote that government reflected human nature: “If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary.”86 Madison continued: “In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself.”87
The recognition of restrictions on government’s power was not limited to Madison. John
Locke, who was the most widely read philosopher during the American Revolutionary era, wrote
the following in his Second Treatise of Government: “The legislative cannot transfer the power
of making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who
have it cannot pass it over to others.”88 He continued, “the power of the legislative, being
derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institutions, can be no other than what
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that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the
legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other
hands.”89 Even the Supreme Court has recognized this restriction on governmental power. In
the 1892 case Field v. Clark, the Court ruled, “That Congress cannot delegate legislative power
to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of
the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”90
However, regulatory authority dramatically expanded following two major Supreme
Court rulings. In the 1937 case Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp, the Court held that “intrastate
activities that ‘have a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions’ are within
Congress’ power to regulate.”91 Also, in the 1942 decision Wickard v. Filburn, the Court held
that withholding goods from interstate commerce affects interstate commerce since such goods
have the mere potential to cross state lines. Therefore, Congress was emboldened to regulate
intrastate, as well as interstate commerce.92
Since these rulings were issued, the power and influence of the administrative state has
expanded beyond all reasonable limits. In 2008, the Small Business Administration estimated
that annual regulatory compliance costs totaled $1.752 trillion. In 2012, the Obama
Administration issued new regulations costing $236 billion. EPA regulations alone cost $172
billion.93 The 2012 Federal Register, the official publication documenting administrative and
proposed rules, exceeded 77,000 pages in length. The 2011 and 2010 Federal Registers had
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been 81,247 and 81,405 pages long, respectively. In 2011, regulatory agencies issued 3,807 final
rules, while only 81 new bills were signed into law by President Obama that same year.
Bureaucracies issued 212 “economically significant” federal rules in 2012, each of which was
projected to impose more than $100 million in economic costs. In the ten years preceding 2013,
economically significant rules increased by 108 percent.94
Obamacare also imposes a substantial regulatory burden. This law is approximately
2,700 pages long. An analysis by Peter Ferrara of the Heartland Institute found that this law
established over “150 new bureaucracies, agencies, boards, commissions and programs” that “are
empowered to tell doctors and hospitals what is quality health care and what is not, what are best
practices in medicine, how their medical practices should be structured, and what they will be
paid and when.”95 During the law’s initial implementation, the executive branch issued twenty
thousand pages of regulations, with initial Internal Revenue Service regulations alone accounting
for 159 pages.96
In recent years, discussions about regulatory policy have been centered on the Trump
Administration’s deregulatory efforts. In the early days of his administration, President Trump
announced Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs.”
The goal of this executive order was to eliminate two federal regulations for every new one
implemented. This directive was widely successful, with the Trump Administration claiming
that the FY 2020 ratio was 3.2 to 1, and 1.3 to 1 if only significant deregulatory actions were
counted.97
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Additionally, calendar year 2020 ended with 3,353 final rules in the Federal Register, up
from 2019’s 2,964 final rules. The latter figure was the lowest count since records were first
kept in the 1970s and is the only total that is less than 3,000. However, the Trump
Administration added 202 additional rules between New Year’s Day and Inauguration Day 2021.
Of the 3,353 final rules, 2,149 had been published in the Federal Register by the end of calendar
year 2020. While this figure was President Trump’s highest yearly total, it was below every
other figure prior to his presidency except for President Obama’s level of 2,044 in 2009.
President Trump’s lowest figure was 2017’s 1,834, which was also the lowest figure on record.
Furthermore, in 2017, the Federal Register finished at 61,308 pages, the lowest count since 1993
and a 36 percent decline from President Obama’s record number of 95,894 pages the previous
year. The 2020 Federal Register rose to 86,356 pages, the second highest figure on record.
However, this number included President Trump’s rollbacks of rules. Thus, there were
historically fewer rules in total during this time.98
Despite noticeable success, President Trump’s regulatory policies were not without
problems. According to the CEI, the regulatory compliance costs and economic effects of
federal regulations totaled $1.9 trillion in 2020. This amounted to 9 percent of U.S. gross
domestic product that year, which the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis
estimated at $21.17 trillion. CEI notes that if it were a country, U.S. regulatory costs would be
the eighth largest economy in the world (excluding the U.S.), ranking ahead of Brazil. Such
costs rival the combined federal individual and corporate tax receipts in 2020, which totaled
$2.076 trillion, as well as corporate pretax profits, which equaled $2.237 trillion.99
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Additionally, the Weidenbaum Center at Washington University in St. Louis and the
George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center in Washington, D.C., jointly estimated
that federal agencies spent $88 billion in FY 2020 to administer and implement the policies of
the regulatory state. Furthermore, if the entire costs of federal regulations were paid directly by
U.S. households, then each household would pay an extra $14,368 on average each year. This
figure amounts to 17 percent of the average pretax household income of $82,852 and 23 percent
of the average household expenditure budget of $63,036. This figure exceeds the average cost of
every item in the household budget except housing. Thus, this regulatory cost is greater than the
average household’s annual expenditures on apparel, entertainment, transportation, food, health
care, services, or savings.100
The Trump Administration had limited success in its deregulatory ambitions due to the
goals of an entrenched federal bureaucracy. As Clyde Wayne Crews observes, “Agencies’ stated
priorities and “inventories” of rules were warning signs for Trump’s deregulatory agenda all
along…the longer horizon signaled agencies poised to reverse course and to issue substantially
more regulatory actions than deregulatory ones. That impulse to regulation is unencumbered
under Biden’s new executive directives to agencies.”101
While a politician such as President Trump can make progress in reducing the federal
regulatory burden, they will inevitably be stymied by the entrenched federal bureaucracy, as well
as the fact that their ideological opponents will rescind such polices as soon as they regain
power. When implemented, these regulations impose a massive economic burden. Given these
facts, the only way to implement lasting structural change to the federal bureaucracy is to adopt
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an amendment to rein in the power of the regulatory state. The proposed amendment outlined
above is the proper means for accomplishing this task.
An Amendment to Promote Free Enterprise
Congress’s power to regulate Commerce is not a plenary grant of power to the federal
government to regulate and control economic activity but a specific grant of power
limited to preventing states from impeding commerce and trade between and among the
several States. Congress’s power to regulate Commerce does not extend to activity
within a state, whether or not it affects interstate commerce; nor does it extend to
compelling an individual or entity to participate in commerce or trade.102
During their time, the Founders clearly articulated the proper role of the Commerce
Clause, which is to give Congress the power to regulate interstate trade. In Federalist 42, James
Madison wrote that “a very material object of this power was the relief of the States which
import and export through other States from the improper contributions levied on them by the
latter.”103 He continued, “Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it
must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during
the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter
and the consumers of the former.”104 In Federalist 45, Madison proclaimed that “[t]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”105
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In Federalist 17, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “the supervision of agriculture and of
other concerns of a similar nature…which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can
never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction.”106 In Federalist 36, Hamilton referred to
“agriculture, commerce, [and] manufacturers” as “different…kinds” of wealth, property, and
industry,” not as fused in commerce.107 Finally, at the Constitutional Convention, George Mason
stated that the “general government could not know how to make laws for every part [state] –
such as respects agriculture.”108
In 2001, Randy E. Barnett, an expert on the Commerce Clause and a law professor at
Georgetown University, found that after reviewing the Federalist Papers and the Constitutional
Convention, the Founder’s initial intent on commerce was as follows:
In Madison’s notes for the Constitutional Convention, the term ‘commerce’ appears
thirty-four times in the speeches of the delegates. Eight of these are unambiguous
references to commerce with foreign nations which can only consist of trade. In every
other instance, the terms ‘trade’ or ‘exchange’ could be substituted for the term
‘commerce’ with the apparent meaning of the statement preserved. In no instance is the
term ‘commerce’ clearly used to refer to ‘any gainful activity’ or anything broader than
trade.”109
Barnett noted that “in none of the sixty-three appearances of the term ‘commerce’ in the
Federalist Papers is it ever used to unambiguously refer to any activity beyond trade or
exchange.”110 He also wrote that after “having examined every use of the term ‘commerce’ that
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appears in the reports of the state ratification conventions, I found that the term was uniformly
used to refer to trade or exchange, rather than all gainful activity.”111 Finally, Barnett stated that
“if anyone in the Constitutional Convention or the state ratification conventions used the term
‘commerce’ to refer to something more comprehensive than ‘trade’ or ‘exchange,’ they either
failed to make explicit that meaning or their comments were not recorded for posterity.”112
While the Founders intended for the Commerce Clause to grant the federal government
the power to regulate interstate trade, two major Supreme Court decisions have expanded this
power to the regulation of intrastate economic activity. These are the aforementioned cases of
Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp. and Wickard v. Filburn. In the 1937 Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp.
case, the Supreme Court ruled that intrastate activities can be regulated by Congress because
they “have a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce [such] that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.”113
In the 1942 case Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court opened the door for the
Commerce Clause to justify a limitless array of federal regulations on private activity. This
Supreme Court case involved Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio dairy farm owner. He used part of this
farm to grow wheat, which he used in four different ways: He either sold the wheat, fed it to his
livestock, used it to make flour, or used it for seeding for the following year. While all this
wheat was produced and used within Ohio, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 set quotas
on the amount of wheat he was allowed to produce. Filburn was fined when he exceeded this
quota.114 Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that goods that had the mere potential to travel across
state lines could be regulated by Congress under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Clause.
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Due to the usurpation of the Commerce Clause by the Supreme Court and the federal
bureaucracy, a constitutional amendment is needed to reestablish the proper framework through
which interstate commerce can occur. Such an amendment would help preserve civil society and
promote individual liberty. As Dr. Milton Friedman once explained, “Freedom in economic
arrangements is itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so economic freedom is an
end in itself…[E]conomic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of
political freedom.”115
An Amendment to Protect Private Property
When any governmental entity acts not to secure a private property right against actions
that injure property owners, but to take property for a public use from a property owner
by actual seizure or through regulation, which taking results in a market value reduction
of the property, interference with the use of the property, or a financial loss to the
property owner exceeding $10,000, the government shall compensate fully said property
owner for such losses.116
Property rights are a fundamental pillar of a free society. In The Second Treatise of
Government, John Locke claimed that the government cannot take a man’s property without his
consent. Locke stated that “for the preservation of property being the end of government, and
that for which men enter into society it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should
have property, without which they must be suppose[ed] to lose that by entering into society,
which was the end for which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any man to own.”117
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In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone wrote that “so
great…is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of
it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were
to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to
the public; but the law permits no man…to do this without consent of the owner of the land.”118
In the Virginia Declaration of Rights, George Mason proclaimed that “all men are by
nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights…namely the enjoyment of
life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property….”119 Accordingly, the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution explicitly states: “…nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation.”120
Property rights have been undermined by several Supreme Court decisions. In the 1922
case Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”121 The vague standard of “too far” gave subsequent courts the broad ability to arbitrarily
decide whether such a taking had occurred.
In the 1978 case Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, the Court ruled that there is
no set formula to determine whether a particular regulatory taking of property merits
compensation, but that there are factors that have particular significance. Such factors include
“the economic impact of the regulation, particularly the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”122
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In the 1992 case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, even the originalist Justice
Antonin Scalia hinted that a regulation devaluing a property of 95 percent of its value may not
constitute a taking, and that the property owner would not necessarily be entitled to
compensation.123
In the 1993 case Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for
So. Cal., the Court ruled that the “mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is
insufficient to demonstrate a taking.”124
Finally, in the 2005 case Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Court stated that it would
consider the “character of the governmental action…whether [the regulatory taking] amounts to
a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests ‘through some public
program.’”125
Since the right to private property has been gradually eroded over time, an amendment is
necessary to further protect this fundamental right. This proposed amendment “acknowledges
the crucial distinction between the government exercising its legitimate police powers to protect
private property rights and its obligation to compensate property owners when government
action – whether a statute, administrative regulation, or executive order – interferes with the
ownership and use of private property for an asserted public interest.”126 “Moreover, the
proposed amendment creates an expanded legal basis for private property owners to assert a
constitutionally acknowledged and protected right. The notion that a taking must be physical,
total, or near total to trigger a “just compensation” defies the Framers’ intent and the Fifth
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Amendment’s purpose.”127 “Finally, the proposed amendment is not limited to takings by the
federal government. It applies to all levels of government.”128
An Amendment to Grant the States Authority to Check Congress
There shall be a minimum of thirty days between the engrossing of a bill or resolution,
including amendments, and its final passage by both Houses of Congress. During the
engrossment period, the bill or resolution shall be placed on the public record, and there
shall be no changes to the final bill or resolution. [This requirement] may be overridden
by two-thirds vote of the members of each House of Congress. Upon three-fifths vote of
the state legislatures, the States may override a federal statute. Upon three-fifths vote of
the state legislatures, the States may override Executive Branch regulations exceeding an
economic burden of $100 million after said regulations have been finally approved by the
Congressional Delegation Oversight Committee. The States’ override shall not be the
subject of litigation or review in any Federal or State court, or oversight or interference
by Congress or the President. The States’ override authority must be exercised no later
than twenty-four months from the date the President has signed the statute into law, or the
Congressional Delegation Oversight Committee has approved a final regulation, after
which the States are prohibited from exercising the override.129
In the Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Associate Justice Joseph
Story observed that “[a] government, forever changing and changeable, is, indeed, in a state
bordering upon anarchy and confusion. A government, which, in its own organization, provides
no means of change, but assumes to be fixed and unalterable, must, after a while, become wholly
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unsuited to the circumstances of the nation; and it will either degenerate into a despotism, or by
the pressure of its inequalities bring on a revolution.”130 He continued, “It is wise, therefore, in
every government, and especially in a republic, to provide means for altering, and improving the
fabric of government, as time and experience, or the new phases of human affairs, may render
property, to promote the happiness and safety of the people.”131 Story concluded that “the great
principle to be sought is to make the changes practicable, but not too easy; to secure due
deliberation, and caution; and to follow experience, rather than to open a way for experiments,
suggested by mere speculation or theory.”132
On November 13, 1815, John Adams wrote Thomas Jefferson that “[t]he fundamental
Article of my political Creed is, that Despotism, or unlimited Sovereignty, or absolute Power is
the same in a Majority of a popular Assembly, an Aristocratical Counsel, an Oligarchical Junto,
and a single Emperor. Equally arbitrary, cruel, bloody, and in every respect diabolical.”133
There are two major examples of expansive legislation passed in recent years that illustrate the
need for the States to be able to override Congress.
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on
July 21, 2010. Dodd-Frank implements four hundred separate rulemakings by eleven different
federal agencies. It also established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which has the
power to regulate credit and debit cards, mortgages, student loans, savings and checking
accounts, and nearly every other consumer financial product and service. Two years after its
passage, over 8,000 pages of regulations had been issued, and regulators were only about 30
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percent finished. Compliance with this law is estimated to total 24 million labor hours a year and
require businesses to hire over 26,000 personnel just to comply with existing regulations.134
Nearly a decade ago, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act
of 2013. Despite its commendable name, this bill was passed with virtually no debate and
without the ability of members to offer amendments.135 Additionally, VAWA’s constitutionality
is questionable because of due process concerns. According to William Creeley and Wendy
Kaminer, the VAWA reauthorization would result in a form of double jeopardy against college
students accused of sexual assault, as well as “implicitly reinforce Education Department
‘guidance’ demanding colleges water down due process protections in campus disciplinary
proceedings.”136
This law has other major problems. Columnist Daniel Horowitz articulated several of the
troubling provisions contained within this iteration of VAWA. First, “it expands the definition
of domestic violence to include causing ‘emotional distress’ or using ‘unpleasant speech.’”137
Additionally, this law gives “tribal Indian authorities jurisdiction over non-Indians accused of
domestic violence within the borders of an Indian reservation.”138 Furthermore, VAWA “grants
more visas to illegal immigrants who claim to be victims of domestic abuse.”139 Finally, the
subject of domestic abuse has traditionally been dealt with by state and local governments
because these entities are vested with the police power to deal with crimes committed against
their residents. However, VAWA implements a federal prosecutorial and investigative regime
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that is located within the Department of Justice. Horowitz asserts that the billions of dollars
spent on this federal regime “have shown no success in reducing incidents of domestic violence,
while precluding state and local governments from dealing with the problem as reflected by the
reality in their areas of jurisdiction.”140
The purpose of this proposed amendment is to give states the ability to repeal, not amend
or replace, certain dangerous laws and regulations within a specific timeframe. More
specifically, such a federal statute or regulation would have to impose an economic burden
meeting or exceeding $100 million, and three-fifths of the states would have to vote to repeal
such laws or regulations within a two-year timeframe. The states would be prohibited from
imposing new federal laws in a manner that would circumvent the legislative powers of
Congress. Additionally, this amendment would require a minimum of thirty days to pass
between the engrossing of a bill and its final passage by both houses of Congress. The purpose
of this requirement is to ensure that citizens, state officials, and members of Congress are fully
aware of the contents and implications of the bills pending before Congress, as well as to give
Congress adequate time to deliberate on these bills. However, Congress can bypass this thirtyday waiting period by a two-thirds vote in both houses. Such a provision would allow measures
such as military funding and a declaration of war to pass in a genuine national emergency.141
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Conclusion
There are significant obstacles that pose a fundamental threat to the American Republic.
These include fiscal irresponsibility, corruption in Congress, an unaccountable federal
bureaucracy, and hostility by the political elite toward economic freedom and property rights.
On its current course, the nation is destined to be destroyed. A major course correction is
necessary. One solution is to elect more responsible and accountable people to Congress.
However, this strategy has consistently failed to achieve lasting positive change, as evidenced by
record-high deficits and debt, an unaccountable federal bureaucracy, a widespread disrespect for
property rights, and an entrenched political elite of career politicians. Another solution is for
citizens to encourage Congress to propose constitutional amendments to address these problems.
However, such an approach relies on the same politicians who have presided over, and in many
cases have caused, this nation’s decline.
The only true solution is for the people to pressure their legislatures to call a Convention
of States under the jurisdiction of Article V of the Constitution. Opponents of an Article V
Convention argue that such an approach would result in a “runaway convention” that would
threaten the existing Constitution. Not only is this argument false for multiple reasons, but it
ignores the fact that the United States currently has a “runaway” federal government that
threatens the future and the fundamental rights of its citizens.
In recent years, the Convention of States movement has had great success in building
momentum for an Article V Convention. As of April 2022, 19 states have adopted the
Convention of States organization’s resolution to impose fiscal restraints on the federal
government, limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and limit the terms of
office for its officials. Accordingly, more than half of the 34 states necessary to call an Article V
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Convention have passed the Convention of States resolution, with Wisconsin, Nebraska, West
Virginia, and South Carolina all passing this resolution in the first several months of 2022. With
the faithful grassroots support of millions of patriotic Americans, the Convention of States
movement will be able to generate the momentum necessary not only to call a convention, but to
subsequently ratify amendments that the convention proposes. If this strategy proves successful,
then the federal bureaucracy will be limited, fundamental rights will be secured, and the United
States will be freer and more prosperous than ever before.
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